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1 The early Cold War period, that of the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev leaderships, is the
period  when  changes  in  technology  permitted  a  rapid  acceleration  in  the  mass
dissemination of information and increased contact with the West. It is the period when
the  Soviet  population  began  to  demand  a  level  of  parity  with  economically  leading
nations.  Perhaps most importantly,  it  is  the era in which both a finite objective,  the
creation of communism by 1980, is set for the Party and the state, and a widespread
conception of what is the West, is created. The goal of the Soviet government in the 1950s
and 1960s was not to emulate the political  or economic system of Western capitalist
democracies ; it was to overtake them in terms of the provision of wealth ; a wealth that
was  to  be  equitably  distributed  and  to  which  social  programmes  were  implicitly
understood to belong. Thus, the Soviet leadership set the terms for the dialogue between
the government and society. Calling for multiparty elections was treason -- calling for
improved housing conditions, fashion alternatives, access to passenger cars, etc., was not.
Positive  statements  about  the  economic  and  technological  successes  of  the  West,
particularly as they pertained to the Soviet future, were means by which individuals and
the  state  could  share  a  language  and  have  a  common  ground  for  discussion  while
pursuing interests that met and diverged. Thus, consumption served as both a prime
motivational factor and a safety valve for releasing the pressure of discontent. Within the
USSR, the idea of consumption was consumed more readily than the ever-scarce goods.
Failure or perceived failure, in the areas of technology, science and standard of living had
the potential to destabilize and delegitimise the regime at home and abroad. Thus, it was
of prime importance to the nomenklatura to attempt technical transfer without cultural
diffusion. The AvtoVAZ project is representative of the importation of a technical idea
from the West and the reality of the West as seen in the cooperation with Fiat.2
2 The automobile  remained an elite  item in  the  Soviet  Union until  the  1950s  when it
became a symbol for, although not a possession of, the masses. It was associated with
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freedom,  power,  privacy and technology.  Perhaps one of  the most  important  images
associated with the car was that of  a haven from the society’s  panoptic eye and the
unreliability of public transport. It was also a place where the individual was in control.
Soviet media promoted the idea that a car was a combination of international technical
culture and national  character,  and that “it  may be ranked with such phenomena of
culture  as  architecture,  theatre,  and painting”.3 The  adoption of  the  car  as  a  major
cultural icon was logical because images of modernity,  speed, and advancement were
integral  to  the  conception  of  the  Soviet  self ;  and  it  was  destabilising  because  it
intrinsically involved “values of individualism and private property.”4 Viktor Nikolaevich
Poliakov, the former first general director of Volzhskii avtomobil´nyi zavod (VAZ), can be
quoted  reiterating  a  phrase  attributed  to  Stalin :  “the  passenger  car  is  a  bourgeois
notion.”5
3 Discussion of  the  problems  facing  the  Soviet  light  automotive  industry  began under
Khrushchev, despite Khrushchev’s decision to favour car pools over private passenger
vehicles. In his memoirs, Khrushchev was to write “I think it certainly would have been
better  from an  economic  standpoint  to  buy  that  license  [for  a  Finely  Moody  bacon
factory] rather than one for a Fiat automobile plant.”6 Research was conducted into the
viability of fitting current cars with modern Western components, for example fitting the
Volga with tubeless tyres “as is  standard in the US and Western Europe”7 as well  as
purchasing new vehicles. Information was gathered on various models from Fiat, Alfa
Romeo, Lancia, Rover, Opel, Mercedes, Ford, Porsche, Peugot, Citroën, Nash, etc.8 In 1962,
the Second Italian Industrial Exhibition was held in Moscow. Despite the general nature
of the exhibition that presented the Italian way of life, the purity of the sun, the beauty of
the landscape, and the Italian culture, a dominant theme was transportation : displays,
models, and examples of cars, buses, planes, gas stations, and electric trains. Highlights of
the transportation section were the Selena, a joint Fiat-Ford product, and the GIA, an
elegant model from Fiat that had been displayed in the previous year but which now had
a new steering wheel. The work of Italian car designers and engineers was reported as
“astonishingly industrial and artistic.”9
4 In 1965, Aleksei Nikolaevich Kosygin announced that the Soviet Union was manufacturing
vehicles  that  were  obsolete  in  the  West  and  poorly  suited  to  the  Soviet  economy.10
Concurrent with Kosygin’s announcement was increased coverage of international car
shows, and articles on the benefits and modernity of passenger car production and the
infeasibility  of  development  without  foreign  participation.  The  question  was  not  if
private passenger cars were necessary but what type was most suitable for the nation. K.
Bakhtov, a member of management at VAZ, recalled that during the 1960s it was widely
accepted that the car industry was simply too far behind international standards to catch
up  independently.11 Evgenii  Artemovich  Bashindzhagian,  a  member  of  the  initial
negotiating delegation, believed that “from the very beginning the course went that it
must be a completely modern European car.”12 Although the Soviet elite did choose to
introduce new lines and technology into preexisting car and truck factories by means of
foreign cooperation, the preference was to establish new international turnkey factories.
13 V. N. Poliakov defended the deal with Fiat by stating that the technical levels of Fiat
were in accordance with international standards, and that Fiat often worked with Ford
and other respected automotive manufacturers.14 Less mentioned were the extremely
favourable credit conditions.
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5 The contract with Fiat was based on the production of 600,000 passenger cars a year and
included $550 million USD worth of machinery plus technical assistance. The output level
of VAZ was to be one car every 22 seconds.15 Fiat was to assist with the start up, and to
provide continuing technical and organisational advice. Production was to begin in 1969,
with full capacity being reached by 1972. The streamlined factory was to employ between
35,000 and 40,000 workers, 10,000 less than a comparable plant in the West. This was to be
achieved through copious amounts of automation.16 This high level of automation was to
contribute  to  extensive  technical  ties,  quality  controls,  training,  joint  technological
developments to be maintained over a decade.17 Thus, the VAZ contract included several
clauses  that  would  result  in  personnel  cooperation.18 AvtoVAZ was  to  epitomise  the
commitment  to  modern  management  methods  that  included :  significant  levels  of
independence,  accountability  of  managers,  the  wage  system  and  supplements  for
professionals. In reality, an average of 96,000 workers were employed.19 Despite industrial
priority and rapid construction, the first cars were not produced until April 1970, when in
commemoration of Lenin’s 100th birthday the first vehicle was produced with the use of
subassemblies  brought  in  from  Italy.  General  production  began  in  August  and  full
capacity was reached in 1974. There were to be three versions of the Zhiguli produced :
the standard, the luxury, and the family edition. Thirty percent of production was to be
for  export.  Like  most  Soviet  industries,  VAZ  was  not  dependent  on  exports  for  the
continued survival of the factory, but typically workers received bonuses and/or higher
wages for work on exports.20
6 Despite  the  generally  positive  response  to  the  building  of  AvtoVAZ there  was  some
concern, voiced in such public forums as Pravda, that the technology being employed
would cause problems for supplying factories. This concern was justified. Many of the
initial parts for the Fiat 124/VAZ 2101/Zhiguli/Lada were to be supplied by other plants,
some of which were to be newly constructed or modernised. At the time that the contract
with Fiat  was signed,  the Soviet Union did not produce the 92-octane petrol  (on the
standard 66-octane  petrol,  there  would  be  no  possibility  of  reaching  140  km/hr),21
lubricants, coolants, or the motor oil, upon which the Fiat 124 ran. There were also safety
concerns resulting from inadequate materials. For example, the Ministry of Petroleum-
refining and Petrochemicals was unable “to supply us [VAZ] with good-quality door seals,
packing glands, brake seals and other rubber articles. The safety of people riding in cars
depends on these seals. [...] Probably it is unprofitable for the petrochemical plants to
bother with ‘small stuff’  -- after all,  their plan is expressed primarily in tons.”22 N. I.
Letchford recalled a conversation with Poliakov in which they spoke of the difficulties in
producing metals of required quality.
-- Viktor Nikolaevich, I am not getting any results. All the regimes, all the variants
that I have tried -- crap.
-- What do you want from me ?
-- I need Italian metal.
-- Think again. It won’t happen.
-- Look, I need to understand, as a metallurgist, what to do, I need a sample.
-- OK. But only as an exception.23
7 The plastics industry was simply unable to meet contemporary demand for automotive
parts :  the  Volga  had no basic  plastic  parts ;  and the  Moskvich had forty-nine  parts
weighing in at 3.36 kg. The international average at the time was one hundred and thirty
details at 8 kg.24 Eventually, the Fiat 124 was modified for a lower plastic usage. It was also
modified for Soviet road and weather conditions. In the end, Soviet engineers altered
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65 % of the parts.25 It is therefore not surprising that the press was able to run interviews
with Italian workers in which one read : “I come from Turin, I am familiar with Fiat and
thought that in Togliatti I would see a copy of the Italian establishment, but nothing was
duplicated.”26
8 In response to the increased production of passenger cars, the Ministry of Transportation
called for the creation of new lorries in order to ship this new abundance of cars.27 Press
commentaries agreed that the production problems lay not solely with VAZ but with its
suppliers. Poliakov estimated that the VAZ production required the introduction of up to
one thousand new components and materials and that this was an excellent opportunity
to bring Soviet industry as a whole up to a new level of modernity.28 Subsequent research
support  the  idea  that  VAZ  made  a  substantial  contribution  to  bringing  both  car
manufacturing and the national economy to a new qualitative level.29 As Soviet designers,
engineers,  planners,  and workers were presented with the challenge of  creating new
materials and components to “international standards,” the idea of Western modernism
was reinforced. The AvtoVAZ with its plethora of new parts and materials was significant
in this domino effect. In the official press release commemorating the 50th anniversary of
the USSR the heroic advances of the socialist economy through the work of those at VAZ
was hailed.30
 
The necessity of foreign presence ?
9 The  Soviet  Union  was  not  bereft  of  technological  advances  under  Khrushchev  and
Brezhnev. Its military capabilities had made it one of two superpowers, and its space
programme was the best in the world. However,  when VAZ workers interviewed and
surveyed in 200231 by the researcher were asked if the Soviet Union could have developed
and mass-produced an economy car without foreign cooperation, 92.3 % (See Appendix A)
said that foreign cooperation was necessary. Former VAZ translator Elvira Simonovna
stated that she felt that Fiat was as necessary to VAZ, as Ford was to Gorky, if not more so.
She expanded on this by noting that foreign participation, “more than just Italian”, was
necessary as it brought with it a new town, new technology and a better life for Soviet
workers.32 Question five of the survey asked why the factory was established at Togliatti
as opposed to modernising pre-existing factories. The majority (37 of 40) responded that
it  was  primarily  due to  the abundance of  natural  resources  in  the area,  gas,  hydro-
electricity  from  the  Volga,  and  proximity  to  a  main  transportation  artery.  A
supplementary explanation given was the need to create something new :  “we in the
Soviet Union had never had a normal automobile and we were far behind the West.”33
This need for the new was a by-product of the stunning political, social and economic
changes of the Khrushchev era. Question six of the survey asked : “If Fiat was necessary,
why ?” Answers focused on the fact that Fiat offered a modern, affordable product, an
economical means of achieving a goal, and access to new technology. “At that time in
Russia we didn’t produce an automobile of that class,”34 it offered “advanced technology
to the standard that existed in other countries,”35 a “more or less fast means of mass
production,”36 “for the USSR it was necessary to have experience in the European field of
automobiles,”37 “our level of automotive industry was low. At that time, the level of Fiat
was at the level of the world,”38 and “I think that the partnership could have been with
another European automotive firm but in the competition for the project Fiat won.”39
That the idea of the necessity of producing new passenger cars with foreign participation
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is  omnipresent  is  perhaps  an  indication  of  effective  propaganda  intersecting  with  a
welcoming public.
10 Western technology did not remain an abstraction. VAZ engineer O. Rozenkov wrote that
his 50 % automated Fiat line was more economical in terms of materials and that the
machine  did  not  need  as  highly  qualified  workers  as  the  lines  with  which  he  had
previously worked.40 N. M. Golovko recalled how he and his fellow workers “saw, learnt,
and became acquainted with the Fiat factory -- it was absolutely of another standard.
More progressive rigs, instruments, effective control means, organised use of technology,
and better economic and control standards.”41 Head engineer S. P. Polikarpov recalled the
excitement and priority given to VAZ during the planning phases. He was always flown to
Moscow, where he was put up in the best hotels,  served at the best restaurants,  and
chauffeured  in  the  best  cars,  “all  because  we  were  to  build  the  best  automobile.”42
Polikarpov recalled the gradual  dwindling of  optimism that  followed quickly because
“when we finished VAZ, in the West it was already practically obsolete. [...] By that time,
they had already gone farther.”43
11 The myth versus the reality of Soviet modernity, quality and organisation were to be
sorely tested by VAZ. In 1968, A. Tsygankov, a chemistry specialist who had worked at the
automotive repair factory Gruziia went to work in Togliatti along with his “enthusiastic
friends”, although they were aware that were currently needed construction workers,
cement and steel specialists, etc. He remembered that there were so many new people
that the majority of fellow workers were unknown and the working conditions were “half
chaos.” When asked what for him was the beginning of VAZ, A. I. Grechukhin, who went
to VAZ as an inexperienced graduate, answered : “an article by Marietta Shaginian in
Izvestiia about VAZ, Fiat, the city. It was a well-written article. And I thought : it wouldn’t
be a bad place to work in this factory... It was only a thought. I decided then to go.”44 The
result of the propaganda and hiring practices was a massive gender imbalance (more men
than women),  groups of men waiting to begin their work,  and newly moved families
without the usual support networks. The chaos was not entirely due to the flood of new
workers,  as  in the spring of  1969,  when the main building was not yet  finished,  the
bulldozers were doing double duty trying to finish work on the building and to clear away
the snow, and the Italian specialists were to arrive in late spring with the main conveyor/
assembly line. The subjective impact of the disorganisation was magnified by the push to
achieve a high level of completion before the foreigners arrived and to produce the first
car (April  22nd,  1970)  in time for the 100th anniversary of  Lenin’s  birth.  Due to the
impossibility of doing both, the building, as well as many of the smaller production units,
was left unfinished.45 K. Bakhtov recalled a conversation with the head Italian engineer
Mr Bono. Bono : “Listen, you are trying to do everything quicker and quicker, and for
what ? We don’t understand. We were at the factory together and saw how much work
was left. It is not possible to complete it in a year and you want us to try to have it
finished in half a year at the latest.”46 Former motor master Vladimir Isakov remembers
the oft-asked phrase in Italian : “why isn’t this work finished yet ?”47 Another rush to
prepare the factory was in response to Henry Ford Jr’s decision in 1970 to act upon an
invitation to view the factory and to make recommendations.48
12 Despite a degree of general disillusionment following the construction of VAZ, public
opinion  of  the  Zhiguli  and  of  VAZ  remained  high.  In  1967,  the  book  New  Soviet
Automobiles by O. V. Cherkin drew attention to the integral role of the VAZ 2101 in the
realisation  of  the  great  possibilities  of  mass  Soviet  car  production.49 The  magazine
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Krokodil (no. 1, January 1969) was to announce the beginning of production in Togliatti
with  a  front  cover  cartoon.  The  cartoon  consisted  of  a  picture  of  a  massive  crowd
surrounding the Zhiguli. There are three quote/caption bubbles in the drawing. Working
from top and then clockwise they read : “But do you know if there are any spare parts to
purchase ?” “A fine car. Perhaps we could split it na troikh ?” And a baby crying “I want a
car”  with  the  mother  answering :  “Don’t  torment  the  child,  buy  a  Fiat.”  This
acknowledged  problems  along  with  successes :  a  new car  of  a  foreign  standard,  but
shortages of parts and of the automobile itself.  In January 1970, the widely published
journal Za rulem ran a series on passenger cars that focused favourably on the VAZ 2101
(Fiat 124). The Fiat 124 was generally considered to be the best economy car of the time, a
European type car50 that offered a cost effective solution to the Soviet passenger car
problem. When asked what their opinion of the Zhiguli was in the early 1970s, those
surveyed generally praised both the car and the factory. VAZ employee Lidiia Nikolaevna
stated that “the automobile was absolutely comfortable and pretty ; the factory was the
best in the country, as big as Fiat.”51 Other surveyed individuals wrote that “there wasn’t
a factory like VAZ in all of Russia,”52 “the factory was the best in the USSR and one of the
best in Europe,”53 “I saw the prospective factory and automobile in 1969 and in response
came to this city to build my life.”54 “My opinion about the automobile model Zhiguli is
that it was a wonderful automobile, and about the factory -- the foremost in technology,”
55 “the factory and the automobile were of a high quality. 60 % were sold abroad (sic),
taken by various countries,”56 and “at that time (beginning of the 1970s) I  was really
amazed by the factory.”57 These opinions about the factory and its product were imbued
with a sense of comparison with the West. The factory was as good as or better, as big as
or bigger, as modern as any in Europe.
 
Incentives for workers
13 Togliatti was to be a new modern city, affording all possible conveniences.58 Calls went
out to young workers and specialists : a position in Togliatti came with the promise of a
single family flat, modern facilities, fertile plots of land/dachas, and the prospect of rapid
professional advancement. Residents were to be housed in maximum comfort in one of
three grades of flats : “normal” and then two higher categories (including deluxe split
level flats). Stores were to be located on every block, no workers’ residence was to be
more than fifteen minutes from public transport, and local schools, crèches and medical
centres were to be conveniently located both in each block of housing and in the factory.
By 1972, 36,000 flats were to be completed, and the local population was set at 150,000.59
Streets were designed to be straight and wide, in anticipation of one in four residents
having a car. In essence, an advanced city for the workers and specialists of an advanced
“European type” factory. Thus, a direct correlation between foreign standards and a new
Soviet standard was being established. As incentives to move were concurrent with the
presence of foreign cooperation, the aura of new, prosperous, advanced, and to some
extent personal wealth and freedom (due to the product being the personal automobile)
was subconsciously linked with the West.
14 One of the many incentives for moving to Togliatti was the promise of a private flat. One
interviewee from Moscow noted that while his family received a two-bedroom apartment
within six months (1970), his friend, with whom he had studied and worked, and who had
chosen to remain in Moscow, only received a private flat in the1980s. Irina Mikhailovna,
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an interviewee originally from Novosibirsk, moved to Togliatti with her husband. The
young couple’s primary objective was to get a flat, which they did within four months.
Irina Mikhailovna noted that while she loved living in Togliatti due to the special theatre,
numerous  cultural  groups,  well  stocked  stores,  and  general  modernity ;  and  while
working at the factory was wondrous (all you needed to do was “to turn a key” and a line
worked) she and her family eventually left as benefits of working at VAZ decreased vis-à-
vis northern wages.60 Another economic incentive was the absence of an old established
elite,  as  this  opened  up  advancement  opportunities  and  corresponding  access  to
increased wages, goods and services. The average age of the workers was 26,61 and the
average  age  of  specialists  sent  to  Turin  was  35.  The  newly  created  elite  had  high
expectations, one of which was to own an automobile someday. In a then contemporary
series  of  articles  about  society  and  cars  based  on  a  survey  of  700  Soviet  citizens,
participants were asked when they thought that they would own a car. The response was
within five to ten years among respondents under 40.62 An unanticipated result of the
2002 survey question “What was your best memory of the Lada and the factory ?” was
that 32.5 % of participants felt that purchasing their first car was their best memory. This
percentage of ownership was approximately three times the national average. There were
several ways of obtaining a car. The official channels were winning the state lottery, as a
reward for  outstanding  labour  or  social  contribution,  or  through a  waiting  list.  The
average waiting list  for the purchase of  a Zhiguli/Lada63 was six to ten years,  which
effectively  nullified  economic  pressure  for  technical  improvements.64 Galina
Valentinovna,65 an engineer who worked in design, recalled that she and her husband, a
brigade leader, were on the waiting list although they doubted that they would ever have
enough money to purchase a car. When they did receive a car in 1980, nine years after
starting in Togliatti, and earlier than anticipated due to people before them having been
unable to claim their cars, they still had not amassed enough money. Nonetheless, they
received the car due to their status as “senior workers.”66 Aleksei Pavlovich wrote : “I
bought my first car, the VAZ 2103, in 1972. This day was, naturally, the best.”67 Vladimir
Gennadyvich wrote : “When I purchased the 2101 in 1974, I was very proud and ecstatic,
my dream of having my own car was fulfilled, and more so as it was a Zhiguli.”68 Another
received his Zhiguli from his father who originally purchased it in 1970 and between the
two of them they drove the car for 24 years.69 “When I sat at the wheel of a Fiat 124 in
Italy [I] understood that the future Zhiguli would be klassno!”70
15 The  official  means  of  obtaining  a  vehicle  tended  to  be  rife  with  cronyism  and
painstakingly slow. The nonofficial means included using blat or paying black market
price.71 Thus,  there was a tension between the state mandate to provide cars for the
“average” citizen and the reality of obtaining, and maintaining, a car.  This issue was
internally generated but externally exacerbated by the use of and contact with foreign
technology, personnel and knowledge of rapidly advancing standards in Western Europe
and North America. In comparison to the 32.5 % whose fondest memory was obtaining
their first car, only 2 of the 40 respondents, or 5 %, mentioned working with foreigners or
travelling to Italy as being their favourite memory, this despite 52.5 % having worked
with foreigners in Togliatti and 12.5 % having been to Turin. “Working in a new modern
factory was very interesting and informative... The work at VAZ also gave the possibility
to visit and to learn first hand about Italy”.72
16 The  increased  possibility  to  travel  and  contact  with  foreigners  were  non  economic
incentives associated with VAZ. Two and a half thousand Soviet specialists worked in Italy
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over a five-year period.  The first  delegation was sent to Turin in February 1966 and
stayed until the 4th of May 1966. The length of each stay was variable : 3 weeks to 18
months. Soviet officials facilitated travels whenever possible. For example, A. A. Butko,
from the department of automotive imports, recalled that in fact there was never an issue
of the usual three-to-four-week waiting period for a visa, he and other specialists could
arrange to meet with any European firm within twenty-four hours. Poliakov noted that
during the initial phases of VAZ he and his team of specialists were able to get into the
“work plane (and fly to) Moscow, Turin, wherever they liked, [...] that was the type of
freedom the specialists had.”73 Travel was facilitated by VAZ having been allotted a plane
and pilots. Contact with Togliatti was also facilitated in Turin because there was a direct
line  with Moscow and Togliatti.  These  privileges  of  being exempt  from some of  the
bureaucratic drudgery and of having industrial priority were non economic incentives
that were to be associated, if only subconsciously, with Western industry.
17 The opportunity to work abroad provided new professional and personal experiences.
Prior to 1968, engineer O. G. Oblovatskii  had worked at the Yaroslavl tractor factory.
Upon agreeing to work at VAZ, he was to spend a year abroad in Turin. Recalling this
time : “We [Oblovatskii and colleagues] became acquainted with how to build an industry
in  the  West,  what  capitalism  was  and  how  it  worked.”74 N.  Ustinov,  head  of  the
Department of Important Technology for VAZ, remembered having great respect for the
Italian specialists and his pleasure at being able to work with them in Italy. He discussed
how the team of Soviet specialists and workers worked to assimilate knowledge down to
the smallest piece. “Everything was unknown to us, new. We had many questions.”75 V.
Shuliatiev, who spent almost a year in Turin, confirmed this in an interview for a local
Soviet paper saying that his initial group sought to absorb everything as “everything was
unknown and new.”76
18 A  degree  of  envy  and  resentment  was  expressed  against  those  Soviet  citizens  who
benefited personally from their time abroad. Upon leaving an interview conducted with a
factory  employee  who  often  went  abroad  and  a  medical  doctor  from  the  factory
polyclinic, the doctor asked if this researcher had noticed the unusually high quality of
goods in the home. The doctor noted that the interviewee had gone abroad often and
always came back with clothes, appliances and other sought after goods, noting that the
employee’s children were always better dressed and her house was always finer than
those of people who were not able to go abroad.77 Residents of Togliatti had not good, but
better, possibilities of travelling to Italy as tourists. Their travels normally included a visit
to Turin, Venice, Florence, and Bologna.78 Not all the experiences in Italy were favourable.
V. Ia. Aitukov described his stay in Turin : “We felt ourselves to be like participants in an
anecdote, who had just fallen abroad. One saw in their [Italian] stores at least twenty
types of sausage, thirty types of cheese, and felt faint.”79
19 Individuals  who  were  sent  to  Turin  returned  with  new  ideas,  experiences  and
perceptions.  Their  new  knowledge  was  transmitted  to  others  in  several  ways.
Professionally,  they sought to quickly implement new norms,  methods and practices,
often  straining  the  Soviet  industrial  system  in  their  attempts  to  do  so.  They
communicated their  personal  experiences  to  colleagues,  friends  and family.  To some
extent, the national press told and retold the stories of those individuals who, by working
in Turin, were making a valuable contribution to the Soviet Union’s great leap forward.
The exposure was extensive but not remarkable, for this was a period in Soviet history
when discussing what the West had to offer was fashionable.
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20 While the majority of  foreigners  were Italian,  the result  of  Fiat  subcontracting large
portions of the work to other firms resulted in a strong presence of other foreigners.
Visiting delegations were often covered in the local and national press, in the former
usually on the first page.80 For example, in June 1970, Soviet press announced the arrival
of  four  international  companies  represented  by  their  specialists  in  Togliatti,  one
American  (Landis  Tool),  two  Italian,  and  one  German  (SAKK).81 According  to  a  US
congressional report there were on average 850 foreigners present : 600 workers from
Italy,  and  200  other  Westerners  (Germans,  Britons,  Frenchmen  and  Americans).82
Translator Liudmilla Petrovna noted that there was a demand for English that could not
be fully met.83 The government sought to rectify this through a course at the University
of Leningrad for future VAZ employees that was a combination of English as a second
language and a study of foreign car enterprises.
21 P. M. Katsura has recalled how the working methods of the Italians were of interest to
Soviet  workers.  Italian  workers  were  “ready  to  complete  any  type  of  work.  What
interested them most of all was their wages. For our workers what was important was to
see the end of the line, that today they finished their work....  Never more nor less is
permitted.  It  is  necessary  to  have  the  even  amount  that  is  needed.”84 The  brigade
formations  were  also  different.  The  Italian  teams  worked  more  as  a  loose  group  of
individuals with each doing what one could. In the article “Together with Us” the press
was pleased to report that 30 specialists representing companies from Italy, the Federal
Republic  of  Germany,  the  German  Democratic  Republic,  Denmark,  and  Bulgaria
contributed to the success of the 6th working day of the week.85 O. G. Oblovatskii, who
worked both with the specialists from the German company Schuler as well as with Fiat
specialists,  remembered  the  impact  of  the  Italians :  “For  hundreds  and  hundreds  of
Italians the city of the Zhiguli was not just a work address [...] because here they not only
worked but lived, and worked closely with Russia and its people, even fell in love, started
families.”86 He  also  recalled  that  there  were  many  arguments  between  Italians  and
Russians. The redesigning of the parts proved extremely problematic as it resulted in the
need to rebuild many of the presses.  Many Italian assemblers refused to do anything
other than erect the presses to Fiat specifications, leaving to Soviet brigades to refit the
machines. Vladimir Isakov, a motor master who began working at VAZ in 1969, recalled
his conversation with an Italian engineer from the Mirafiori factory in which the Italian
was against the proposed changes but concluded by saying that it was a matter to be
resolved by the Russian engineers and that they were in charge. Isakov responded with
“thank  you”  and  “don’t  worry.”87 Soviet  planners  often  refused  to  use  the  firms
recommended by the Italians, choosing instead their own supplier or manufacturer. For
example,  the  planners  decided  to  employ  the  West  German  equipment  producer
Liebeherr  instead of  Pfauter,  because  they  felt  that  the  former’s  new methods  were
better.  Basically,  Fiat  refused  to  approve  changes  and  thus  to  guarantee  the  part.
However, some changes were mutual decisions. After the building of the first prototypes
in the Krasnodar region it was discovered that the vehicles could not handle Soviet road
conditions : “the roads were not very good [...] and the car drove, but did not drive more
than nine thousand kilometres.”88 The Fiat also needed to be adapted in order to function
in winter conditions.  The second test car drove a total of thirty thousand kilometres
before needing major repairs.
22 Contact with foreigners was not restricted to the elite nor to work. Question seven of the
survey is about work with foreigners : 12.5 % of the respondents (60 % of which male) had
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worked  abroad ;  and  52.5 % of  the  total  respondents  had  worked  with  foreigners  in
Togliatti  (33 %  of  which  women).  From  those  who  elaborated  about  working  with
foreigners came such comments as : “I worked with the Italian specialists, they were good
specialists,”89 “yes, we worked in Togliatti [with the foreigners], it was a fantastic work
experience,”90 and “I didn’t have contact with them, but I worked alongside them.”91 The
tone of the newspaper articles discussing the participation of foreign workers is similar to
that used by interviewees : there tends to be a generally positive discussion without any
sense of exceptionality. Fiat and its employees were bringing modern technology that was
impressive  but  which  only  through Soviet  tempo,  aggrandizement,  and  modification
would become extraordinary.
23 The degree of outside help, and calls to do things “as it is done in the factory of Fiat,”92 do
not seem to have affected the attitude of local citizens and employees of the factory, the
overwhelming majority  of  whom said  that  it  was  “theirs.”  Indeed,  management  was
under constant pressure to ensure that every aspect of the production and end product
would “be not worse than that in Fiat.”93 Issues of ownership became apparent with three
events.  The first was the dispute over the colouring of the first cars.  It  is commonly
believed (the veracity  of  this  belief  was  confirmed by a  senior  member of  the paint
department) that the Italians thought that the first three cars should be coloured red,
green and white for the Italian flag.94 Soviet officials objected and stated that the first
colours should be that of the flag of the Russian Republic. In the end, the first several
hundred cars were white. The second was the fulfilment of the initial contract in 1975.
When a representative of the factory who had worked there from the beginning referred
to the leaving of Italian workers in 1975, she made it clear that she felt that they had
abandoned the Soviet project. Their contract expired and they simply left, regardless of
what work remained to be completed. 95 By autumn 1975, the press referred to the Zhiguli
as a “Soviet” car with increasingly fewer references to the Fiat 124.96 The third event was
the development of Niva, which was Soviet-designed and produced.
24 During the stay of Italian workers and specialists, various activities were organised that
promoted  contact  with  locals.  Many  of  these  activities  were  organised  by  VAZ’s
international friendship club. They tended to either be cultural, or sports. One example of
a cultural event occurred on the 15th of September 1967 in commemoration of the 50 th
anniversary of the October Revolution. Workers and engineers employed in Togliatti were
joined in celebration by Italian workers who were preparing the technical documents for
VAZ. The Day of the Fast Wheel was a cycling competition between employees of VAZ and
of Fiat. Newspaper articles covering the events were peppered with Italian words and
expressions, buona sera, finito, si si, ciao, etc. Football matches, which eventually evolved
into  a  tournament  held  in  the  local  stadium were  also  a  regular  source  of  friendly
national  competition.97 In  1972,  the  success  of  the  Italian-Soviet  venture  was
immortalised  on  film.  The  Mosfilm  studios,  working  together  with  the  Italian  film
industry, produced a colour documentary about the Avtozavod on the Volga. The film
Factory : Big And At Once was the story “not only about the birth of VAZ, but about the
life of the Italian colony”98 and was produced for Soviet and Italian audiences.
 
Conclusion
25 Soviet leaders were not in a position to create an antithetical self-image to the West, as
there  were  sectors  of  the  West  that  they  sought  to  emulate.  The  result  was  an
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unconvincing combination of  vilification and praise that  permitted the rejection and
condemnation of Western practices such as discrimination, poverty, and war mongering,
while accepting innovation, technology, and economic prowess. “Soviet citizens were told
that they were at the forefront in every sphere, they led the world, and yet disorienting
glimpses on TV,  and above all  foreigners  themselves,  seemed like evidence that  this
might not be so.”99 The international nature of the construction of the AvtoVAZ factory
was  much  heralded  by  the  Soviet  press  and  leadership.  For  the  Soviet  regime  it
highlighted its ability to provide Western quality consumer goods to its citizens ; that it
was  serious  about  meeting  the  material  demands  of  the  people ;  that  there  were
impressive technological advances occurring within the Soviet Union, be this in terms of
sputniks or automobiles ;  and that the Soviet Union was indeed catching up with and
would overtake the West. A then contemporary assessment of the relationship between
VAZ  and  the  Soviet  regime  was  that  the  “rapid  expansion  of  production  of  private
passenger cars at VAZ was an integral part of  the new leadership’s effort to provide
quality consumer goods as incentives for Soviet citizens”.100 At the XXIV Party Congress,
G. K. Mironenko declared not only that the VAZ car was “guaranteed for life” but also
that it was a “symbol of state quality”.101 It was also an endorsement of the policy of
coexistence.
26 The major ideological battle, if not war, between communism and capitalism was to be
won by  the  system best  able  to  provide  the  most  appealing  standard of  living.  The
importance of standard of living as interpreted in part as consumption is not revisionist.
Looking back on the social transformation that resulted from World War II,  Ludmilla
Alexeyeva wrote that “a ‘collective’ of faceless people could not have won the war, [...]
they acted as citizens.”102 Elena Zubkova came to a similar conclusion : through the war
there was a creation or intensification of civic spirit, responsibility and self worth.103 One
of the most influential Western undertakings to gather the opinions of Soviet citizens
during the Khrushchev era was the Harvard Interview Project under Inkeles and Bauer.
The findings are illustrative of the preexisting discontent with the Soviet capacity to
provide amenities and commodities. Two of the top three grievances were economic in
nature.104 Without terror to pacify the hostile population and with economic issues being
of  paramount  importance,  the  Communist  government  had  little  alternative  but  to
attempt to rectify the issue. This is particularly relevant when the increased sense of
worth and entitlement on the part of the average citizen is taken into consideration. The
perception that the general standard of living was failing to rise is askew with the general
economic trend as  seen in both Soviet  and American statistical  information,  initially
showing  significant  increases  that  were  to  taper  off.  “For  all  the  Soviet  Union’s
comparative  economic  failure,  there  was  in  absolute  terms a  great  deal  of  ‘material
progress’, as the Victorians called it, over a large part of Soviet history. This occurred
primarily but not solely on Khrushchev’s watch.”105
27 In Togliatti there was the newest, best and technologically most advanced equipment. In
Togliatti one could more quickly obtain those material goods to which the majority of
Soviet citizens of the period aspired : a flat, a dacha, easier access to nursery schools, a
car, and professional advancement. The AvtoVAZ factory was a testimony to the hard
work of the Soviet worker. The Zhiguli/Lada was a Soviet car made in a Soviet factory, but
both official sources and survey respondents maintained that it could not have been done
without  the  technological  and  managerial  assistance  of  Fiat  and  other  outsourced
companies.
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28 How does one trace the dissemination of an image into Soviet society ? The entry point,
an exhibition, the construction of a factory, international travel, a film festival, literature,
newspaper articles, etc., can be documented. This initial impact in terms of individuals
exposed is often gaugeable, for example in the case of an exhibition, film festival,  or
factory. It is the ensuing ripples that become unclear : who then read or heard about
events ?  With whom did the factory worker talk ?  How far and fast  was information
transmitted  from  formal  or  informal  direct  sources  to  informal  ones ?  To  further
complicate the clarity of events, it was not a case of a single event with its impact on
society  with  the  reverberations  settling  before  another  event.  Khrushchev and early
Brezhnev eras were ones of scattered and numerous international events. However, by
analysing the entry points, the diffusion of information as far as can be measured and the
evident  final  social  impact  (analogous  to  the  ripples  around  the  entry  point),  an
understanding of the general economic image of the West as it was assimilated into Soviet
culture can be ascertained. The propaganda about the West in its entirety was by nature
similar to the Soviet system. It was complex, inconsistent, and often contradictory.
29 The AvtoVAZ is but one example of how the Soviet government facilitated the creation of
a positive economic image of the West. Taken on its own it represents an intense episode
of  “positive”  economic  exposure  both  industrially  and  personally.  Placed  within  the
context of its time, surrounded by numerous other examples of the propagation of this
image, it illustrates the widespread phenomena that eventually resulted in Soviet citizens
being provided with an “other” that was seemingly better suited for the attainment of
their material objectives. Images are a combination of concrete ideas and the shadows
that  surround them.  What  was  not  conveyed in the positive  image of  the West,  the
shadow as it were of the economic image, was how it could be achieved without adopting
the evils of capitalism. The society was provided with an objective, and an allusion to the
system that was currently leading in the attainment of this objective. From the launching
of sputnik to the first man on the moon, the consistent valuing of Western technology
and implicitly the standard of living, coupled with the consistent vilification of the means
of creating and achieving this, resulted in the creation of an image of the West in which
the means were unfair, unjust and unacceptable but in which the results were lauded and
sought.
30 The derisive image of the West and Westerners as intellectually shallow, materialistically
driven and morally corrupt was not coupled initially with a dismissal of the inherent
desirability of modernisation or consumerism. Under Khrushchev there was some faith
that  consumerism and communism could successfully  coexist.  However,  consumption
could not be allowed to replace ideology nor could it be effectively used as a replacement
for terror.106 By the end of the Brezhnev era it was generally accepted that the Soviet
Union was unable to fill in the technological and scientific gap with the West. This loss of
faith can be cited as a major contributing factor to the rise of anti-Americanism. If the
launching  of  sputnik  represents  the  zenith of  Soviet  optimism  in  the  future  and  a
correlating positive image of the West, then the landing of the first man on the moon by
the Americans in 1969 marked the beginning of its decline. The economic image of the
West defined the gravitational centre that served as the abstract definition of one of the
most highly valued parts of Soviet future. The central challenge for the regime was how
to thaw without melting away.
31 University of Glasgow Department of Central and East European Studies
32 nnordicathea@ aol. com
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Profile of questionnaire respondents
 
APPENDIX B -- Song
33 Turinskoe nebo pokryto tumanom, I kazhetsia nebo ogromnym karmanom. Karmanom, v
kotorom  chut´-chut´  porabotav,  Popriatalis´  zvezdy  --  svetit´  neokhota.  Popriatalis´
zvezdy -- svetit´ neokhota. A v Tol´iatti vetra. Mnogo raznykh zabot. Ot utra do utra liudi
stroiat zavod. A v Tol´iatti vetra. Mnogo raznykh zabot. Ot utra do utra liudi stroiat zavod.
Po Tripoli c shumom nesutsia mashiny. S asfal´tom tseluias´, skvoz´ noch´ voiut shiny.
Pod sumrachnym nebom molchit Gamalero. Zabyv pro Turin, krepko spiat inzhenery.
Zabyv pro Turin, krepko spiat inzhenery. A v Tol´iatti vetra. Mnogo raznykh zabot. Ot
utra do utra liudi stroiat zavod. A v Tol´iatti vetra. Mnogo raznykh zabot. Ot utra do utra
liudi  stroiat  zavod.  Kogda-nibud´  my soberemsia  v  Tol´iatti,  I  vospomnim San-Karlo,
potrogav sediny. Poka zhe razlukoiu s sem´iami platim. Za to, chtob v Tol´iatti my delali
mashiny. Za to, chtob v Tol´iatti my delali mashiny. 
34 First published in 1967, written by Lev Vainshtein
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NOTES
2. The primary source material for this work reflect the primary objective of examining
the economic image of the West through the VAZ experience. Thus, figures have been
taken as representing what was being said and not wherein reality lay. This delineation
also means that extremely rich archival material has not been included.
3. Iuliia Smarnova, Avtovaz : segodnia i zavtra (M.: Interbook, 1991), 7.
4. Michael  Bull,  “Soundscapes  of  the  Car :  a  Critical  Ethnography  of  Automobile
Habitation,” in David Miller, ed., Materializing Culture : Car Cultures (Oxford : Berg, 2001),
186.
5. See for example V. N. Poliakov, “Molodezh´ dolzhna reshat´ na VAZe glavnye zadachi,”
Volzhskii avtostroitel´, (27.04.2000): 2.
6. N.  S.  Khrushchev,  Khrushchev Remembers :  The Last  Testament,  transl.  by  Strobe
Talbott (London : Little, Brown and Co. 1974), 142.
7. Rossiiskii  gosudartstvennyi  arkhiv  ekonomiki  (RGAE),  Po  voprosu  podgotovki
proizvodstva legkovogo avtomobilia m-402 f. 9480, op. 2, d. 3. l. 115-125, 116.
8. RGAE, l. 115-125, 121-123.
9. A. Radkin, “Na ital´ianskoi promyshlennoi vystavke,” Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR, no.
8 (1962): 43-44.
10. A. N. Kosygin, “Povyshenie nauchnoi obosnovannosti planov -- vazhneishaia zadacha
planovykh organov,” Planovoe khoziaistvo, (April 1965): 6, 9-10.
11. Interview with K. Bakhtov, in A. Shavrin, VAZ: 30-letie volzhskoi avtomobil´noi istorii
(Finland : Benecap, 1997), 129.
12. Interview with E. A. Bashindzhagian, in A. Shavrin, VAZ, 63.
13. For details of this discussion, see the December 1969 Party Plenum and the XXIV Party
Congress in March-April 1971.
14. V. N. Poliakov, “Vaz dlia menia -- eto vse,” Volzhskii avtostroitel´, (01.02.2000): 2-3.
15. M. Sbornik, Avtovaz -- sovremennoe proizvodstvennoe ob´´edinenie. (Znanie, 1977), 5.
16. “Iz doklada pervogo sekretaria obkoma KPSS V. P. Orlova na VII plenume obkoma
KPSS  o  zadachakh  oblastnoi  partorganizatsii  v  sviazi  so  stroitel´stvom  zavoda  po
proizvodstvu  legkovykh  avtomobilei,”  27.05.67,  27-31  as  printed  in  VAZ:  istoriia  v
dokumentakh : 1966-1983gg (1985), 28.
17. Sergio  Riccio,  “Italian Contradictions,”  International  Affairs,  no.  8  (August  1966):
39-43: 43.
18. In a press interview, the president of Fiat Giovanni Agnelli stated that “construction
of such scope ensured a great demand for our technical  specialists.” As quoted in L.
Yugov, “Soviet-Italian Contacts Expand,” International Affairs, no. 7 (July 1966): 33-39, 3.
19. Sbornik, Avtovaz ..., 5.
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20. Interview with Nikolai Naumov in which he discusses his work in Moscow, in David
Mandel, Interviews with Workers in the Former Soviet Union : Perestroika and After :
viewed from below (New York : Monthly Review Press, 1994), 66.
21. Zhitkov said that the petrol was available in Moscow, but that it was difficult to find.
A. A. Zhitkov, Vershinoi zhizni stal VAZ (Togliatti, 1997), 32.
22. “More Difficulties of the Auto Age,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 27,1, 6-7: 7. For
more complaints specific to the Zhiguli, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 26, 51:
27-28.
23. N. I.  Letchford, in VAZ: Stranitsy istorii,  vospominaniia i fakty (Finland : Benecap,
1997), 116.
24. S. Mateev, “Perspektivy razvitiia avtomobil´noi promyshlennosti v novom piatiletii,”
Planovnoe khoziaistvo (Moscow), no. 7. (July 1966): 21.
25. For  a  detailed  description  of  the  technical  details  for  the  VAZ-2103/Zhiguli,  see
“Avtomobil´ VAZ 2103 Zhiguli,” Avtomobil´nyi transport, no. 6 (June 1973): 41-47, 47.
26. “ U vas est´ chemu pouchit´sia, ” Volzhskii avtostroitel´,  (25.05.1974): 2.  The non-
transliterated spelling of Togliatti is being used as the city was named in honour of the
Italian communist leader Palmiro Togliatti (1893-1964).  Togliatti  had a long and close
association with the Soviet Union, having spent most of an 18 years’ exile in Stalinist
Russia.  Togliatti  maintained  ties  with  Khrushchev,  despite  his  written  but  never
presented Yalta Memorandum in which he ascribed to the need for the autonomous
development of socialism in various countries. He was in Yalta to meet with Khrushchev
when he passed away in 1964.  Two common transliterated spellings  for  the city  are
Toliatti and Tol´iatti.
27. See A. Zbar, L. Piriatinskii, and V. Iurchenko, “ Avtopoezd dlia perevozki avtomobilei
VAZ 2101,” Avtomobil´nyi transport, no. 6. (June 1973): 45-47; or M. Sidorov, “Avtopoezd
dlia perevozki avtomobilei VAZ,” Avtomobil´nyi transport, no. 3 (March 1973): 44-46.
28. In an interview with Poliakov, “Molodezh´ dolzhna reshat´ na VAZe glavnye zadachi,”
Volzhskii Avtostroitel´, (27.04.2000): 2.
29. Smarnova, Avtovaz : Segodnia..., 19.
30. As reprinted in VAZ: Istoriia v dokumentakh : 1966-1983gg (1985), 65.
31. The criteria for the representative sample were individuals present from either the
beginning of the construction of the city/factory, or from the beginning of production. Of
the  40  respondents  25  were  male  and  15  female.  In  total,  7  were  members  of  the
Communist  Party.  Those  who  responded  to  the  questionnaires  represent  a  broad
selection of workers at the factory from individuals who worked (work) on the assembly
line, in the presses, in maintenance as well as in design, translation, engineering, and
other sectors run by, but not technically part of, the production of the factory, i.e. doctors
who worked in the AvtoVAZ polyclinic. In addition to the questionnaires, interviews were
conducted either as a supplement to, or instead of, the written questionnaires.
32. From an interview with Elvira Simonovna, 17.03.2002.
33. Questionnaire no. 6.
34. Questionnaire no. 39.
35. Questionnaire no. 36.
36. Questionnaire no. 31.
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39. Questionnaire no. 7.
40. O. Rozenkov, “Svarka... namorazhivaniem, ” Volzhskii avtostroitel´, (06.03.1973): 3.
41. Interview with Nikolai Maksimovich Golovko, in VAZ: stranitsy istorii..., 208.
42. Interview with Stanislav Petrovich Polikarpov, in A. Shavrin, VAZ, 42-43.
43. Ibid., 47.
44. A. I. Grechukhin, in VAZ: stranitsy istorii..., kniga vtoraia, 29.
45. A.  Tsygankov,  “Kak molody my byli,  kak iskrenne liubili,”  Volzhskii  avtostroitel´,
(01.07.1997): 4.
46. See R.  Bannikov,  “Na kubok druzhby” and I.  Litovchenko,  “Den´ bystrykh koles,”
Volzhskii avtostroitel´, (02.09.1970): 4.
47. Vladimir Isakov, “Zdravstvui, VAZ,” Volzhskii avtostroitel´, (12.04.2000): 2.
48. Iurii Bezdetnyi, “Kak rozhdalsia avtogigant,” Tol´iatti segodnia, (19.06.1996): 6.
49. O.  V.  Chirkin,  Novye  sovetskie  avtomobili  (Znanie,  1967),  or  see  the  review  in
Avtomobil´nyi transport, no. 7 (1967): 1.
50. The term “European type” had only positive connotations and was used in regular
speech as well as by the press. See V. Koftelev, “Na volne pamiati,” Tol´iatti segodnia,
(19.04.1997): 15.
51. Questionnaire no. 4.
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56. Questionnaire no. 38.
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58. Reporter A. Nikitin wrote of the city surrounding the Kama factory : “The city will be
representative of the communist tomorrow, a city experiment [...] built with the same
skill and vision as the city of Togliatti.” “Budet na Kame Avtozavod, ” Trud, (11.10.1969):
4.
59. V.  Pravosud,  “Ia  znaiu  gorod  budet,  ”  Volzhskii  avtostroitel´,  (06.11.69):  3.  It  is
important to note that the figures given on the number of flats were published by the
Soviet  government  and  may  be  more  inspirational  than  factual  in  detail.  The
propagandistic nature of figures used in the Soviet press is problematic only when used as
facts. Here they are intended to convey the promises and the Soviet reality as presented
by the Soviet government to Soviet citizens and not necessarily reality itself.
60. In an interview with Irina Mikhailovna, conducted in spring 2002.
61. A young master who transferred from Gorky to VAZ in 1970 commented that although
the factory was huge and produced many cars, it was more compact than Gorky and that
his working group was in principle small, 17 workers, all of whom were young. O. Salbiev,
“Vernyi orientir,” Volzhskii avtostroitel´, 6 (05.08.1972): 2.
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Volzhskii avtostroitel´, no. 25 (01.11.69): 4., or V. Ashkin, “Bagazhnik nuzhen, no kakoi ?”
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RÉSUMÉS
Résumé
Sur la voie de la consommation de type communiste : AvtoVAZ
L’automobile, symbole de modernisation, d’occidentalisation et de richesse individuelle tel qu’il
fut  diffusé par le  projet  AvtoVAZ mené conjointement avec Fiat,  a  rapproché les  aspirations
économiques et politiques du gouvernement soviétique et de la population. L’objectif annoncé
était de permettre au citoyen moyen d’acquérir une voiture de qualité européenne. Des dizaines
de milliers d’ouvriers et de spécialistes participèrent directement au « projet de la décennie » et
peu d’entreprises échappèrent à ses répercussions. Le projet et la participation étrangère furent
couverts  dans  la  presse,  à  la  radio,  à  la  télévision  et  au  cinéma.  L’article  présente  le  projet
AvtoVAZ comme l’illustration des contacts avec l’Occident (ses idées, ses produits, ses citoyens)
approuvés officiellement et montre par quels moyens les Soviétiques ont pu se faire une idée de
l’Occident. Le régime communiste propageait activement l’image d’un Occident plus avancé en ce
qui  concerne  l’accès  des  masses  au  progrès  technologique  et,  de  façon  plus  sélective,  aux
commodités de la vie (aux biens de consommation plus qu’aux services) afin d’encourager le
citoyen soviétique à « rattraper » et à « dépasser » l’Occident, validant par là la supériorité du
régime communiste.
Abstract
The image of the automobile as a vehicle of modernisation, westernisation and personal wealth
as represented in the AvtoVAZ (VAZ) project in conjunction with Fiat bridged the economic and
political aspirations of the Soviet government and Soviet citizens. The publicised objective was to
provide  the  average  citizen  with  access  to  a car  of  European  quality.  Tens  of  thousands  of
workers and specialists were involved directly, and few industries remained untouched by the
“project of the decade”. Both the project itself and the active foreign involvement in the project
were reported in newspapers and journals, on the radio and television and in film. In this article
the AvtoVAZ factory is used as an example of officially sanctioned contact with Western ideas,
individuals,  and  products  and  how  this  contact  is  illustrative  of  the  means  by  which  the
“average” Soviet citizen was able to form a perception of the West. The concept of the West as
more advanced in the mass application of technology, and in the (albeit selective) provision of
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“all  of  life’s  comforts”  in  terms of  goods,  if  not  in services,  was  actively  propagated by  the
communist regime. This image was intended to motivate the average citizen to “catch up” with
and “overtake” the West, thereby validating the superiority of the communist system.
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